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Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations
CORBASec brings role-based security to CORBA-object-wrapped simulations.
John H. Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio
Distributed-object computing systems
are presented with many security
threats, including network eavesdrop-
ping, message tampering, and commu-
nications middleware masquerading.
NASA Glenn Research Center, and its in-
dustry partners, has taken an active role
in mitigating the security threats associ-
ated with developing and operating
their proprietary aerospace propulsion
simulations. In particular,
they are developing a collab-
orative Common Object Re-
quest Broker Architecture
(CORBA) Security (COR-
BASec) test bed to secure
their distributed aerospace
propulsion simulations.
Glenn has been working
with its aerospace propul-
sion industry partners to de-
ploy the Numerical Propul-
sion System Simulation
(NPSS) object-based tech-
nology. NPSS is a program
focused on reducing the
cost and time in developing
aerospace propulsion en-
gines.
NPSS has been developed
by Glenn and sponsored by
the NASA Ames Research
Center. Glenn is an active
domain member of the Object Manage-
ment Group (OMG) — an open mem-
bership, not-for-profit consortium that
produces and manages computer indus-
try specifications (i.e., CORBA) for in-
teroperable enterprise applications.
When NPSS is deployed, it will assemble
a distributed-aerospace propulsion-sim-
ulation scenario from proprietary analyt-
ical CORBA servers and execute them
with security afforded by the CORBASec
implementation.
The NPSS CORBASec test bed utilizes
the Portable Object Adaptor (POA) ar-
chitecture from the VisiBroker 4.x Ob-
ject Request Broker (ORB) [Borland
Software Corp., Scotts Valley, CA], and
the Orbix 2000 ORB [IONA Technolo-
gies, Dublin, Ireland, with U.S. head-
quarters in Waltham, MA]. Quadrasis
[Software Solutions Division of Hitachi
Computer Products (America), Inc.,
Waltham, MA] integrated both VisiBro-
ker 4.x and Orbix 2000 ORB architec-
tures with their security service [Hitachi
Security Service (HSS)]. The NPSS re-
quired a security service that was com-
patible with both ORBs. Glenn and two
United States aeropropulsion-industry
companies are the initial partners con-
tributing to the NPSS CORBASec test
bed. The test bed uses Security SecurID
[RSA Security Inc., Bedford, MA] two-
factor, token-based authentication to-
gether with HSS digital-certificate-based
authentication to validate the various
NPSS users.
The CORBASec test bed was inte-
grated across firewalls. The process of
getting CORBASec to communicate
across firewalls was a large accomplish-
ment. Unlike processing Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) messaging,
firewalls do not have designated ports
for CORBA Internet Inter-ORB Protocol
(IIOP) traffic. NPSS also verified the
CORBASec and firewall design by test-
ing with multiple vendors’ firewalls. The
OMG is now working on a Firewall Tra-
versal specification that promises to pro-
vide a standard solution to the COR-
BASec firewall-integration problem. It
will take some time before the CORBA
and CORBASec vendors implement this
standard solution. NPSS chose to move
ahead with a workable solution.
The CORBASec architecture is a flexi-
ble ORB security architecture that sup-
ports both security-unaware and secu-
rity-aware application development.
CORBASec security-unaware security
features are primarily configuration-
based, requiring very little programming
and its security services are implicitly in-
voked at the ORB interceptor layer. The
CORBASec security-unaware architec-
ture spares the application developer
from having to write large amounts of se-
curity code as the ORB interceptor layer
has been configured to handle COR-
BASec message traffic automatically.
The CORBASec security-aware architec-
ture is for applications that need 
fine-grain security. Security-aware appli-
cations enforce fine-grain or applica-
tion-specific security policies via the
CORBASec application programming
interface (API) explicitly invoked secu-
rity services. Unlike security infrastruc-
ture-based APIs such as the java.security
package, the Java Cryptography Exten-
sion (JCE), and the Java Authentication
and Authorization Service (JAAS), COR-
The Functional Blocks and the relationships among them depicted in this diagram represent the CORBASec multiple
security domain, multiple ORB interceptor services, and application invoked architecture.
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BASec [like Enterprise Java Beans
(EJB)] supports container-based secu-
rity, in which a rich array of security ser-
vices enforce security transparently, al-
lowing the developer to concentrate on
building the application rather than the
supporting infrastructure. The para-
digm shift away from a security API re-
sults in security software that is con-
trolled and managed at the ORB
interceptor layer and is less prone to
programming error.
Within the computer-security disci-
pline there is much talk about role-
based security. In the distributed-
computer-security world, CORBASec,
unlike other distributed role-based se-
curity models (e.g., EJB security), de-
fines security domains to allow parti-
tioning of enterprise systems that need
to secure large numbers of resources.
The NPSS team needed a design suit-
able for the enterprise systems and
therefore, we chose to use the COR-
BASec approach. The choice of a de-
sign that supports multiple security do-
mains has enabled the NPSS team to
develop a highly scalable architecture
that allows room for growth. 
The CORBASec test bed is designed to
provide peer (client and server) role-
based authorized security at the CORBA
object (interface, method, and variable)
levels. For the purposes of discussion,
this article focuses on the functionality of
the peer client: The CORBASec client
authorization architecture (role-based
design) allows each client access to a sim-
ulation object’s functionality based on a
run-time comparison of the clients’
granted roles and credentials against the
required rights of the object. The test
bed uses the HSS administration tool to
configure three NPSS client user roles:
developer, general user, and restricted
user. Initially, each client role-based user
is checked for the proper security do-
main access. Developers are granted full
access to the private and public simula-
tion object variables and methods as well
as access to methods unique to program-
mers. General users are granted full ac-
cess to all private and public simulation
object variables and methods (except 
developer-only methods). Restricted
users are granted only public access. If
necessary, various other role-based 
configurations can be developed with
the CORBASec test bed and its HSS
administration tool.
In the figure, the two ovals labeled
Site 1 and Site 2 represent separate
aerospace propulsion company net-
work sites. The two ovals labeled Secu-
rity Domain 1 and Security Domain 2
contain CORBA servers shown as boxes
labeled HSS Manager, Interpreter, Sim-
ulation, and SecBuddy. The dashed ar-
rows depict the flows of public infor-
mation among these servers. The solid
arrows depict the flows of delegated
private information among these
servers. The boxes outside the ovals in
the figure represent CORBA clients.
The HSS Manager at each site authen-
ticates clients for access to specific se-
curity domains.
The test bed is expected to demon-
strate NPSS CORBASec-specific policy
functionality, confirm adequate perfor-
mance, and validate the required Inter-
net configuration in a distributed
collaborative aerospace propulsion envi-
ronment.
This work was done by Tammy M. Blaser of
Glenn Research Center. Further informa-
tion is contained in a TSP (see page 1).
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